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Abstract
Quantitative data about security threats is a precondi-
tion for a precise assessment of security risks and conse-
quently for an efficient management of information security.
Currently such data is hardly available, especially for small
and medium-sized organizations. In this paper we discuss
different ways of gathering quantitative data and present a
new approach for the collection of historical data on secu-
rity incidents. We propose a platform that collects, aggre-
gates and evaluates data on security incidents from multi-
ple organizations. We identify basic requirements for such
a platform and show approaches for satisfying them. We
especially emphasize the aspects of security and fairness.
Finally we introduce a prototype that shows how an imple-
mentation could look like.
1 Introduction
Organizations of all sizes face a growing need to deter-
mine security risks and to evaluate costs and benefits of
possible security investments. Various factors intensify this
trend. First, there is the growing importance of security in
general because of the growing number of threats and at-
tacks over the past years (see [7]). Second, due to the law
of decreasing marginal utility, we know that there must be
a utility maximizing bundle of security measures. So secu-
rity managers are looking for that optimal bundle to invest
in or in other words they seek to answer the question “How
much is enough” ([12]). Finally there are compliance re-
quirements. A variety of external regulations like Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and Basel II stipulate that organizations are able
to assess their risks, including security risks.
Analyzing costs and benefits of security investments
and assessing security risks are corresponding tasks. The
biggest part of benefits of security measures cannot be mea-
sured directly since their main utility lies in the reduction
of risks. This explains why security management should be
based on a “business risk approach” ([9]). Risk can be de-
fined as the combination of the probability of an event and
its consequence ([9]). The assessment of these two factors
is the basis for the risk treatment step and consequently for
every economic oriented evaluation of security. On higher
levels this information can be aggregated in business ratios
like ROSI, transfered into security scorecards and the like
or be used as input for simulations.
Most existing approaches for security management and
security risk management are based on best practice or at
most on qualitative data and expert judgments. The disad-
vantage of best practice approaches is their inability to de-
cide between different alternatives. Qualitative judgments
at least enable rudimental comparisons between different al-
ternatives, although they cannot be used to compare security
investments to other investment alternatives. However, for
precise risk analysis and sound decisions quantitative data
is a prerequisite (see [12]).
Many approaches assume that there is quantitative data
readily available without telling from what sources to get
that data. Hence we will identify and evaluate different pos-
sible sources for quantitative data in section 2. In section 3
we develop and present the idea of a platform to share and
collect historical data on security incidents. Afterwards we
identify special requirements for such a platform in section
4. Finally we present a prototype implementation (section
5) of our concept and conclude by lining out challenges for
the future.
2 Sources for quantitative data
2.1 The challenge
Different authors state that the quantitative data re-
quired for efficient security management is not available
([12],[13]). The problem can be outlined as follows: As
shown above the main utility of security measures lies in the
reduction of risks. Consequently the data that is required in
the field of security management is data on risks i.e. in-
formation on possible future security events with a nega-
tive outcome. Soo Hoo [12] identifies five key variables for
which data is required:
• frequency of bad events,
• consequences of bad events,
• measures of safeguard efficacy,
• costs of implementing safeguards,
• and additional profits.
In our opinion the first two of them are the most challeng-
ing to determine. Needless to say that the future cannot be
exactly predicted. As in other fields we have to use proba-
bilities, probability distributions and expected values. Since
those values cannot be directly measured the challenge is to
find good mechanisms to make estimates of those parame-
ters for the future.
These problems are well-known in other areas. In the
field of security the collection of such data is especially
challenging, because of the fact that it is an extremely com-
plex and fast evolving field. To date there is to our knowl-
edge no generally accepted way of collecting quantitative
data and there are no such databases available.
Data that can be used for security management must ful-
fill various requirements. We propose the following criteria
for data sources that are relevant for security management:
• data quality: precise values, good prediction quality,
objective and un-biased, originally quantitative
• up-to-dateness: up-to-date data, periodic updates pos-
sible
• organization specific: consider parameters that are
unique for the organization, like risk associated with
custom made software
• completeness: consider all possible threats and risks,
not restricted to the technical level
• practicability: easy to assess, working solutions
In the following we will analyse different data sources and
discuss how good they adapt to these challenges.
2.2 Potential sources
We have identified four potential sources for quantitative
data on security risks:
• Questionnaires and other expert judgments. Based
on their knowledge and experiences internal or exter-
nal experts can make predictions of a firm’s future risk
exposure. Those judgments can be assessed systemat-
ically using a questionnaire or more freely in an expert
interview.
• Simulations. Simulations are a technique frequently
used in risk management to test the effects of different
scenarios on future developments. They require some
input data, like for example information on probabil-
ity distributions. Historical simulations (see [10]) as
well as Monte-Carlo Simulations (see [2]) have been
proposed for the field of information security invest-
ments.
• Historical data on security events/incidents. In other
domains, like for example the insurance sector, the use
of historical data to predict the future has a long tra-
dition. Insurance companies have huge collections of
data on past events that is used to estimate risks for
the future. Usually the data is extrapolated to adapt to
assumed future developments.
• Market mechanisms. The lack of quantitative data
on computer security (see [11]) was one of the reasons
for the development of market mechanisms for infor-
mation security. One idea is for example to issue so
called exploit derivatives that can be traded like other
stocks. The current quote of these securities could be
used as an estimate for the probability of an exploit be-
ing available, which correlates with the probability of a
security incident based on that exploit. For a profound
discussion of market mechanisms see [1].
2.3 Evaluation
To our knowledge different forms of expert judgments
are the most frequent way of generating data for risk assess-
ment at present. Besides problems like bias and incomplete-
ness the main argument against an exclusive use of expert
judgments is the fact, that they are not originally quantita-
tive. Expert estimations are usually qualitative and have to
be transformed to quantitative data using some heuristic.
Simulations are a valuable concept for testing different
scenarios of the future. But even the best simulations cannot
be done with some input data that has to be determined from
other sources. Consequently they should be used on top
of a primary data source. For example by doing historical
simulations on historical data one could overcome a part of
the constraints of the latter.
There remain only two originally quantitative data
sources: historical data and data from the capital market.
Historical data is well approved in other areas. It cannot
only be used as a direct input for risk assessment but also as
an input for simulations. Critics remark that in the field of
security management, historical data is of limited value, be-
cause risks change so quickly that it is almost impossible to
predict the future from past data. Up till now historical data
is not broadly applied for security risk management purpose
due to a lack of mechanisms for collecting the relevant in-
formation.
Market mechanisms are a relatively new approach and
there are no practical implementations so far. On a theoret-
ical level one can criticize that it is not possible to deduct
probability and impact of an event directly from the market
mechanisms that are known so far. Instead they only give
an estimate for the value of an exploit. Besides that one has
to be aware of the other imperfections of markets.
For market mechanisms as well as for historical data one
has to trade off a broad data base against organization spe-
cific data. If data is collected only for a specific organiza-
tion, it will also contain organization specific factors, but on
the other hand the amount of data might be too small to be
significant.
This inspection shows, that all of the possible sources
have their individual shortcomings. Therefore we rec-
ommend a combined approach using data from different
sources and to improve the existing ways of getting data
from these sources.
The general problem with the evaluation of the above
mentioned sources remains that they have to remain on a
theoretical level since there are hardly any practical experi-
ences. Especially there are no comparisons of the prediction
quality of different approaches. We are convinced that the
collection of historical data on security incidents can be a
valuable tool in security risk management. But a large base
with that kind of data is necessary to test this hypothesis and
to compare it to other approaches. For that reasons we focus
on developing a working solution for the collection of quan-
titative historical data on security incidents in the remainder
of this paper.
3 The basic idea
As we have seen above, the use of historical data is well
proven in other areas. It could also be useful in security
management as a direct estimate and as an input for sim-
ulations. To our knowledge there is no database on secu-
rity incidents that gives information about impact and fre-
quency of security incidents. Of course many organizations
record and sometimes also evaluate their security incidents
and could use this data. But using data only from one sin-
gle organization is not sufficient, especially because of so
called HI/LF risks i.e. risks events that have a low prob-
ability of occurrence but a high, sometimes catastrophic,
impact. However, especially that type of risk is extremely
Figure 1. Main actors
important, since they can threaten the continuity of the or-
ganization. Therefore an inter-organizational approach is
necessary.
Especially in the US there have been efforts to promote
the sharing of security information between organizations
for several years ([6]). Unfortunately most of the resulting
initiatives do not provide a technical platform and do not
consider incentive schemes. Today inter-organizational data
collection is frequently done by CERTS. Since their focus
is more on early warning and countermeasures they are vir-
tually not collecting information on damage and frequency.
So currently there is no technical basis for the collection and
sharing of such information.
Our goal is to establish a platform for the exchange of
information on security incidents with a focus on the col-
lection of data for risk management. Participating organi-
zations will collect information on every security incident
that occurs and submit them to a central platform. Within
the platform the data from all participants will be harmo-
nized and stored. The data will then be aggregated, ana-
lyzed and interpreted. The results are afterwards distributed
to the participants either on special request or in regular re-
ports. The organizations get data probabilities, distributions
and expectation values and can thus improve their security
management. The participants should also have the possi-
bility to use this platform for the exchange of information
and experiences. The platform provider can publish regular
reports with aggregated data.
We consider especially small and medium enterprises as
participants, since they have very limited capabilities to col-
lect data on their own. The only alternative for them is to
regularly buy expert opinions which is very costly. Expert
interviews have shown that it is reasonable to assume, that
firms that don’t see it as their key-competence are willing
to offer some data in exchange for improving the efficiency
of their information security measures if some requirements
are fulfilled (see next section).
3.1 Architecture
The actors in the basic architecture are shown in Fig. 1:
• Participants are organizations that participate actively
in the sharing of security information as a closed user
group. They provide information on security incidents
and receive aggregated data for their security manage-
ment.
• The platform provider is a party that is not actively
participating in the information sharing. Its main task
is to collect, harmonize, aggregate and interpret the
data. It also provides and administers the technical in-
frastructure and sets the organizational framework.
• External data providers add additional information
to improve the quality of the data in the platform.
Figure 2. Main functions
The main functions (as illustrated in Fig. 2) of the system
are:
• Submission: Every time a security incident occurs
within the organization the participants identify and
assess the damages and submit the relevant meta-data
electronically to the platform.
• Collection and storage: The platform provides an in-
terface for the submission of incident data and stores
the submissions. Possibly data from other sources is
added in this step.
• Harmonization: The submitted data has to be stan-
dardized in order to make it comparable between orga-
nizations.
• Aggregation: The harmonized data will then be clus-
tered and aggregated along different dimensions like
for example industry of company, type of incident, etc.
• Interpretation: In this step the data is evaluated. The
goal is to determine likelihood and severity of different
types of incidents and their influencing factors.
• Distribution: After aggregating and analyzing the
data, the platform manager makes the results available
to the participants. This can happen in form of regu-
lar reports or by providing an interface for data analy-
sis. Another possible way of information distribution
would be to provide detailed information on single in-
cidents, thus giving participants the possibility to find
other organizations who have previously encountered
the same problem.
3.2 Microeconomic foundation
Interviews with different companies have shown that
there is a strong interest and effort to participate in such
a platform. Besides that we can also find some theoretical
foundings in microeconomics.
Gordon, Loeb and Lucyshyn [5] have identified vari-
ous economic questions that arise in any “organizational ar-
rangement focused on the sharing information related to se-
curity breaches”. They draw parallels to the fields of trade
associations and research joint ventures and conclude that
the development of a microeconomic model for this case is
necessary. In [6] they develop such a model for the analysis
of information sharing on information security. Their key
finding is, that with information sharing a firm can attain
its optimal level of information security at lower cost and
social welfare is improved. This shows the basic utility of
the proposed platform. However, the authors point out, that
incentive mechanisms are absolutely necessary to prevent
misbehavior like free-riding.
A review of microeconomic literature points out the prin-
cipal utility of such forms of information exchange for par-
ticipants as well as for the overall welfare. However, there
are different points that have to be considered to make a so-
lution work. We will analyze various requirements in the
next section.
4 Special requirements
When designing such a system, naturally various objec-
tions arise from potential participants. The main concern
is of course about the confidentiality of the submitted data.
But there are also other things that have to be kept in mind
for a working solution. In the following sections we iden-
tify the main requirements for such a platform and sketch
how they could be satisfied.
4.1 Security
The data processed in the platform is very sensitive.
Therefore it is obvious that security has to play an important
part in the design of the platform.
According to the principles of multilateral security the
interest of all parties involved should be considered. The
input data, i.e. information on security events and incidents,
discloses a lot of information about the participants. There-
fore confidentiality is of great importance. The possession
of that data gives insights in security measures, potential
vulnerabilities and incident handling strategies. A disclo-
sure of that information could give attackers valuable infor-
mation. However, the predominant barrier to sharing infor-
mation on security incidents with others is the fear of nega-
tive publicity (see [4]). Garg et al. [3] have shown that the
disclosure of information on security incidents frequently
leads to negative stock market reactions.
The data that is provided by the platform is used by the
participants as a basis for their security management deci-
sions. Hence the integrity of that data is critical since wrong
data might lead to wrong decisions. Furthermore the func-
tioning of the system is based on a closed user group. The
platform provider must be sure that only authorized users
can submit and access data.
Attacks on the system could be performed by insiders as
well as by outsiders. Potential attackers include the plat-
form provider, participants, external data providers as well
as other external parties. In the following we have identified
the main challenges, divided up along the three protection
goals.
Confidentiality
1. Confidentiality of communication between partici-
pants and platform. Nobody should be able to wiretap
the data submitted.
2. Confidentiality of data stored in the database. Neither
the participants nor external parties should have direct
access to the information stored in the database.
3. Unlinkability. Even other participants should not be
able to link a reported security incident to a company
without the approval of that firm.
4. Privacy. It should be possible to participate in the sys-
tem without revealing one’s identity to others.
Integrity
1. Integrity of communication between participants and
platform. It should be impossible to modify data ex-
changed between platform and participants without be-
ing noticed.
2. Integrity of data within the platform.
3. Authentication and authorization. Since the basic con-
cept requires a closed user group, it must be guaranteed
that only authorized users can submit and receive data.
Availability
The proposed platform is not a real-time system. Never-
theless availability issues should be addressed. This is true
for the submission system as well as for the data evaluation
components. Especially when it comes to the integration of
third party data, huge amounts of data have to be processed.
To reach these goals, we propose the following security
mechanisms:
1. Establishment of a trusted third party. The platform
manager has a central role. It needs to have access
to all data since it has to conduct the data evaluation
and interpretation. Because of this critical role we
propose the platform manager to be an independent
trusted third party that is accepted by all of the par-
ticipants.
2. Use of cryptographic mechanisms to enhance integrity
and confidentiality. The data between the platform and
the participants should be transmitted encrypted. Au-
thentication and authorization mechanisms can ensure,
that no outsider can access data or provide information
under a wrong identity.
3. Use of privacy enhancing technologies. To hide from
outsiders who is participating in the system, the con-
nections between participants and platform should be
performed using traffic anonymization techniques. To
enable information sharing within the platform with-
out revealing the identity of the organization that has
reported as certain incident pseudonyms should be em-
ployed. As we will see in the next section privacy and
fairness can be conflicting goals.
4.2 Fairness
An issue closely related to the previous section is the as-
pect of fairness. By this term we mean mechanisms that
mainly address the problems of free-riding and the submis-
sion of wrong data.
Free-riding is a well-known problem in economics. Gor-
don, Loeb and Lucyshyn [6] give an overview over that phe-
nomenon in the field of information security. In our case
the term describes the phenomenon when one party is al-
ways taking, but never giving. That means it participates
in the system without ever adding information itself. It just
uses the data provided by others to improve its own security
management. Microeconomic models show that free-riding
can endanger the success of the whole platform. Without
mechanisms to prevent free-riding, participants even tend
to this behavior.
Another issue that has to be considered is the submission
of wrong data. A party might submit wrong data with the
goal to force other participants into suboptimal security in-
vestment decisions. Such a party might be a competitor who
wants others to make economically wrong investment deci-
sions or an attacker trying to influence security measures of
the organizations for example by downplaying the potential
damage caused by some kind of attack.
The third challenge in this area is about the misuse of
data. The data collected and published in the system is in-
tended to be used for the improvement of an organization’s
risk management. In exchange for submitting their data the
participants get information that outsiders don’t get. So it
must be ensured that no party discloses information to out-
siders.
Since all of the above problems are closely related the
mechanisms against them are similar. We see four cate-
gories of measures to foster fairness in the platform:
1. Incentive systems. An incentive system could re-
ward the submission of attempted or successful secu-
rity breaches to reduce the incentives for free-riding.
Another approach might be to charge a certain amount
of money if the number of submitted security events
remains under a certain threshold. Gordon and Loeb
[5] show, that participants in similar systems tend to
submit too low values for damages. They discuss a
submission charge for security events with a pricing
shrinking with the rise of the reported event.
2. Reputation systems. An approach that is used in many
electronic platforms are reputation systems. Partici-
pants get rated by other participants based on the per-
ceived quality of their submissions. In our systems this
rating could be based on the submitted incident reports.
Rating just samples of the submitted data could reduce
the workload significantly.
3. Legal framework. Some legal framework could en-
force fairness. This might be some kind of self-
commitment signed by the participants or even a con-
tract between the participants or between the partici-
pants and the platform provider treating contract penal-
ties. Of course misbehavior cannot be identified with-
out additional mechanisms. So this can only be an
amendment.
4. Technical mechanisms. Technical mechanisms along
with manual and statistical plausibility checks could
support the above mechanisms. The data submitted
by the participants should be cross-checked against the
data collected from external sources. Using statistical
methods outliers could be identified. Those could then
be manually checked for plausibility. This could either
be done by a member of the third party or by posting
the relevant data set to a message board and asking ran-
domly selected participants for their plausibility rating.
Another important factor is that participants are not allowed
to join and leave the platform randomly. The system is
based on a closed user group. We expect the utility for the
participants to be the higher, the longer they participate in
the system. New members can join the platform only if they
commit themselves to the established rules.
4.3 A common language and common
metrics
The biggest merit of the platform is the fact, that partic-
ipants do not have to rely solely on their own experiences
and the quantitative data recorded in their own organization.
They now have the possibility to use a much broader data
basis which shall help them to optimize their risk assess-
ment. Besides that they can benefit from other organiza-
tions’ experiences.
However, such a sharing of information is only valuable
for the parties involved, if the information is comparable at
all. This means that an organization must have the possi-
bility to transfer the information about an incident and es-
pecially the impact to its own business context. The goal
of the platform provider to aggregate the submitted data is
only achievable if the data from different organizations is
compatible.
To reach these goals we see two requirements:
1. A common language for the description of security
events. Today most organizations record quite differ-
ent information on their security incidents in quite dif-
ferent ways. For a sharing system we need a common
taxonomy that allows an unambiguous categorisation
and description. The same security incident has to be
described the same way by two different organizations.
Besides that, dimensions to describe the organization
specific context of an incident are required.
2. Common metrics for the characterisation of damages.
The main goal of the platform is the generation of
quantitative data on damages. Since all organizations
are different from each other it would be inexact to
simply aggregate data from different sources. Com-
mon denominators are required that are easy to use and
make data comparable. Besides recording the financial
impact of an event there should also be other measures
that provide a better comparability like hours to recov-
ery etc.
4.4 Enabling direct information exchange
Interviews with potential participants have revealed an-
other requirement. Besides precise statistical data, users
also would like to have a possibility to exchange experi-
ences on certain types of security events and to share best
practices. This would also require to establish contacts be-
tween the participants and to show information on unaggre-
gated level. Of course this requirement is somewhat con-
flicting with privacy requirements. Therefore the partici-
pants should have a possibility to determine themselves how
much privacy they need and how much information they are
willing to disclose to others.
4.5 Guidance
Practitioners and Researchers state that quantitative data
is necessary for an economic security management. How-
ever, since such data has not been available there is to our
knowledge no precise guidance on which data to use and
how to integrated in the organization’s information security
management system. Such a guideline should aid in assess-
ing risks and selecting the appropriate security measures. It
should also demonstrate how standards and legal require-
ments can be fulfilled by using quantitative data from the
platform.
4.6 Usability
Themore security events are reported by the participants,
the better gets the quality of the output data. Hence there
must be incentives for the participants to report completely.
Thoroughly describing all security events can be a lot of
work. Thus besides the mechanisms described in the sec-
tion on fairness it must also be made as easy as possible to
submit the events.
We see the following possibilities to facilitate the sub-
mission of events:
1. Easy to use web based user interface.
2. Provision of interfaces for different applications that
handle security event data. For example the integra-
tion of existing incident information generated by an
IDS or by a security management system could help
security managers to save time.
5 Prototype implementation
We have implemented a prototype application of our ba-
sic architecture. Its main purpose is to test different mech-
anisms to fulfill the presented requirements and to illustrate
the basic concepts to potential users. With this application
we want to identify where further research has to be done,
evaluate user behavior and especially the data submission
component. In the following section we will give some in-
sights into the technical realization and report on the first
test results.
5.1 Preliminary theoretical work
A thorough analysis of the requirements showed, that a
semantic model for the input of security events is a prereq-
uisite for any implementation of the platform. We there-
fore started by identifying criteria for a good and applicable
semantic model. Afterwards various existing taxonomies
were evaluated against those criteria. We decided that for
our purpose the taxonomy by Howard and Longstaff de-
scribed in [8] was a good foundation due to its similar area
of application and its numerous predefined categories. We
extended it to cover all types of security incidents (like so-
cial engineering) and introduced a differentiation between
internal and external attackers. The system was refined by
categorizing the threats listed in the german baseline protec-
tion manual. Existing taxonomies are all limited to the de-
scription of attacks and vulnerabilities. Our focus is on es-
timating damages. So we had to develop a semantic model
for the description of damages. The model utilizes different
types of damages. To characterize the extent of damage var-
ious categories have been introduced. The main goal was to
find measuring units that are comparable between organi-
zations. To further improve comparability we also defined
measures that characterize the organization itself.
5.2 Implementation details
The implementation is realised as a web-based
client/server-application. The main goal of the prototype
is to use it for tests and demonstration purposes. Poten-
tial participants should be able to use it without installing
additional software so we decided to use a client-interface
that can be used with a standard web-browser. The server-
side is realised using Java Servlets and JavaServer Pages in
combination with a Tomcat Server. As a database we use
PostgreSQL. The application is realised as a multi-tier ar-
chitecture.
To fulfill the confidentiality requirements all communi-
cation between user and platform is SSL-encrypted. Each
participant gets a pseudonym that is used in combination
with a password for authentication at the platform. The in-
formation stored in the platform cannot be accessed from
the outside. For anonymization of the communication we
recommend using some kind of anonymity service like
AN.ON.
In the final system users should have alternatives to us-
ing the browser-based client for the submission of security
events. We therefore decided to use XML for the submis-
sion of events to guarantee interoperability and extensibil-
ity. The semantic model is mapped in an XML-scheme.
To facilitate changes in the semantic model all web-based
forms are generated dynamically from the XML-scheme.
The XML-solution also allows easy integration with secu-
rity management applications that are already in use within
the organizations.
Currently the submitted data is stored in a relational
database. The evaluation is done manually by using sta-
tistical software. For the future we are planning to do au-
tomated data analysis using statistical software and data-
mining tools.
5.3 Conclusion
The architecture is running in a test environment. First
tests showed that most users need guidance with the record-
ing the first incidents since the systems requires many in-
formation.
Currently we are working on methods to use existing in-
formation that is for example stored in security incident re-
porting systems. The next step will be to implement the
evaluation functionalities as well as mechanisms to guaran-
tee fairness within the platform. We are currently evaluating
different kinds of incentive systems.
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have shown why quantitative data is use-
ful for economic security management and pointed out that
it is not available at present. We have outlined why the col-
lection of historical data might be a promising approach.
Therefore we have proposed a complete architecture for a
secure platform for the collection of quantitative historical
data on security incidents. We have identified requirements
which such a system has to fulfill to be practically applica-
ble and showed ideas that satisfy those requirements. With
a prototype implementation we demonstrated that such an
architecture is realizable and also identified critical points.
Our next steps include the further development of the
prototype and a test phase with various organizations. There
are two important challenges. First, we need to implement
mechanisms that guarantee fairness while still considering
privacy requirements. Second, data evaluation has to be au-
tomated. In addition to that we are currently developing
a process model for security management that uses experi-
ences from the field of business engineering.
The platform developed in this paper can contribute to a
more efficient security management by providing the con-
centrated experiences of various organizations in form of
quantitative data. Participating organizations can use this as
input data for their risk assessment and for investment deci-
sions. The information generated might also be interesting
for the development of cyber-insurances since it might be-
come possible to better understand the statistical character-
istics of security incidents.
We are fully aware, that historical data is not a solution
to all problems. There is virtually no way to guarantee that
really all relevant events are reported and of course their is
a proportion of attacks and even successful attacks that is
not discovered an thus cannot be reported. But as the greek
philosopher Perikles is frequently quoted: “predicting the
future accurately is not so important, being ready for it is”.
Even if the data that participating organizations get from
the platform is an imperfect estimate of the future, dealing
intensively with their security management and their secu-
rity incidents will help them to improve the level of security
within their organization.
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